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Abstract 
We argue that the use of publicly available and easily accessible information on economic and 
financial crises to detect structural breaks in the link between stock returns and macroeconomic 
predictor variables improves the performance of simple trading rules in real time. In particular, our 
results suggest that accounting for structural breaks and regime shifts in forecasting regressions 
caused by economic and financial crises has the potential to increase the out-of-sample 
predictability of stock returns, the performance of simple trading rules, and the market-timing 
ability of an investor trading in the U.S. stock market. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of literature centers around the question of whether macroeconomic variables 
contain information that is useful for forecasting stock returns (Fama and French 1989, Chen et al. 
1986, Pesaran and Timmermann 1995, Rapach et al. 2005, to name just a few). For a long time, 
the literature has not paid much attention to the fact that forecasting regressions linking stock 
returns to macroeconomic variables may be subject to structural breaks. Recently, however, 
evidence of structural breaks has been provided by, among others, Timmermann (2001), Rapach 
and Wohar (2006), and Paye and Timmermann (2006). This evidence has led researchers to 
explore the implications of structural breaks and regime changes for forecasting stock returns and 
tactical asset allocation (Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 2000, Ang and Bekeart 2002, Pesaran and 
Timmermann 2002). 
Structural breaks in forecasting regressions have the potential to negatively affect the quality of 
forecasts of stock returns, and they may have a significant adverse effect on the market-timing 
ability of an investor. In order to improve the out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns, an investor 
therefore needs timely real-time information on structural breaks in forecasting regressions. 
Statistical tests for structural breaks are numerous, and given the mounting evidence of structural 
breaks in economic and financial time series many new tests have been developed (Andrews and 
Ploberger 1994; Bai and Perron 1998). Even statistical tests that may guide an investor to detect 
structural breaks in forecasting regressions in real time are now available (Pesaran and 
Timmermann 2002).  
The new statistical tests for structural breaks have the potential to improve the performance of 
investment decisions in future. However, they may be of limited value in analyzing investor 
behavior and stock return dynamics in historical time series for at least two reasons. First, such 
tests have been developed only recently and have not been available long enough to allow an 
investor to utilize these new techniques in real time to search for structural breaks and refine 
forecasting regressions for stock returns. Second, the identification of structural breaks is a purely 
statistical exercise mostly unrelated to predictable or observable economic events. For both of 
 3
these reasons, one should account for an investor’s limited historical information set when 
empirically studying investor behavior and stock return dynamics.  
Beside the question of whether an investor, in real time, would have been able to predict stock 
returns using macroeconomic variables as predictor variables, natural follow-up questions are 
whether such an investor would have been able to use out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns to 
improve the performance of simple trading rules and for market-timing purposes. Last but not 
least, researchers are interested in what can be learned from these studies about market efficiency. 
To obtain valid answers to these questions, it is important to track as closely as possible the 
information set of a real-time investor, and to account for the fact that this information set did not 
contain information on the recent vintage of statistical tests for structural breaks.  
We argue in this paper that an investor, in real time, could have used publicly available and 
easily accessible information on economic and financial crises to detect structural breaks in the 
link between stock returns and macroeconomic predictor variables, and thereby improve the 
performance of simple trading rules. Our approach contributes to the ongoing research on the 
implications of regime changes, extreme events, and systemic financial crises and market crashes 
for an investor’s optimal portfolio choice (Ang and Bekeart 2002, Lui et al. 2003, Das and Uppal 
2004, Kole et al. 2006). In order to illustrate our argument, we extend the recursive modeling 
approach developed by Pesaran and Timmermann (1995, 2000) such that it can be used to account 
for potential structural breaks in the links between stock returns and macroeconomic predictor 
variables. The recursive modeling approach is tailored to account for the fact that an investor, in 
real time, must forecast stock returns under conditions of model uncertainty. The recursive 
modeling approach stipulates that an investor solves this decision problem by systematically 
searching over a large number of different forecasting models to identify the optimal forecasting 
model. As new information on stock returns and macroeconomic predictor variables becomes 
available, an investor recursively restarts this search process and updates the optimal forecasting 
model.  
We show that an investor could have easily conditioned this search-and-updating process on 
information on economic and financial crises using an easy-to-measure and timely crisis indicator. 
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Based on monthly data for the U.S. stock market for the period 1973–2006, we use the default 
spread as our indicator of economic and financial crises. The default spread is defined as the 
difference between the yields on BAA and AAA rated corporate bond portfolios. Fama and French 
(1989) have analyzed the link between expected excess stock returns and the default premium, De 
Bondt (2005) has reported that the default spread leads the stock market, and Elton et al. (2001) 
have documented that the default spread can be explained as a reward for bearing systemic risk. 
Therefore, the default spread appears to be an appropriate measure of economic and financial 
crises. Not surprisingly, the default spread markedly increased in times of economic and financial 
crises like the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the Latin American debt crises of the early 1980s, the 
U.S. Savings and Loans debacle of the mid-1980s, and the events surrounding the 9/11 terror 
attacks and the subsequent accounting scandals. We argue that an investor who would have used 
the default spread as an easy-to-measure and timely real-time indicator of crisis-induced structural 
breaks and regime changes could have significantly improved the out-of-sample forecasts of stock 
returns, the performance of simple trading rules, and the market-timing ability.  
Of course, our suggestion of basing inference regarding structural breaks solely on the default 
spread does not optimally account for structural breaks and regime shifts in forecasting regressions 
in a statistical sense. Moreover, our approach is also unlikely to be optimal in an economic sense, 
as investor’s wealth is not necessarily maximized. However, our rule provides a useful rule-of-
thumb to derive out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns from a limited set of information. This set 
of real-time information does not depend on the exact timing and magnitude of structural breaks. 
Rather, given that there is large uncertainty in real time about the exact timing and magnitude of 
structural breaks, we consider an investor who makes use of a pragmatic modeling approach to 
account for potential structural breaks and regime shifts in forecasting regressions. This pragmatic 
approach only requires an investor to collect publicly available information on the default spread, 
and to condition out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns on this easy-to-measure indicator of 
economic and financial crises. We show that implementing this pragmatic approach reveals new 
insights on the well-documented evidence of predictability of stock returns. 
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Our results also add a new facet to the large literature on cyclical variations in stock returns. 
For example, Whitelaw (1997) has found that conditional Sharpe ratios tend to be lower around 
peaks of the economy, but very high around troughs. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) have 
reported that the expected stock returns of small firms tend to display a larger sensitivity with 
respect to credit market conditions compared to the stock returns of large firms with ample 
collateral. Their results are consistent with theories of imperfect capital markets that predict 
cyclical variations in credit market conditions over the business cycle. Cooper et al. (2001) have 
shown that business-cycle-related predictor variables can be used to develop profitable trading 
strategies that invest in size and book-to-market decile portfolios. Using the NBER recession 
indicator to classify the phases of the business cycle, they show that their results are likely to 
reflect time variation in aggregate, macroeconomic, nondiversifiable risk. Our results contribute to 
this literature in that we analyze how the links between stock returns and macroeconomic predictor 
variables vary across regimes of economic and financial crises. We show that the variation we 
detect does not merely reflect changes in the stance of the business cycle.  
In Section 2, we describe our data. We also describe how we use the default spread to identify 
economic and financial crises. Furthermore, we report results of tests for structural breaks, and we 
present the results of estimating a threshold model. The threshold model gives a clue as to which 
threshold of the default spread may be the most useful to identify economic and financial crises. In 
Section 3, we describe the recursive modeling approach we used to study the variation of the links 
between stock returns and macroeconomic predictor variables across economic and financial 
crises. In Section 4, we lay out our results, and we summarize the results of robustness checks. In 
Section 5 we conclude. 
2. The Data and Evidence of Structural Breaks 
The time series we use in our empirical analysis are from Thomson Financial Datastream. When 
we describe a time series for the first time, we give the Datastream codes in parentheses to 
facilitate the replication of our results. The yields on BAA and AAA corporate bond portfolios are 
the only time series that are not from Datastream, but from the FRED database maintained by the 
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use the difference between the yields on BAA and AAA 
corporate bond portfolios to compute the default spread. We use monthly U.S. data that cover the 
period 1973–2006, where the availability of data governed the selection of the sample period. 
 
2.1 The Default Spread as an Indicator of Economic and Financial Crises 
The BAA-AAA spread reflects credit market conditions for well-established, highly rated firms, 
and is strongly indicative of fundamental factors affecting default risk premia (Duca 1999). This 
spread can, thus, be viewed as a broad-based indicator of the credit quality and the degree of 
distress in financial markets (White 2000, Adrian and Fleming 2005). The time profile of the 
default spread is displayed in Figure 1.  
— Insert Figure 1 about here. — 
The figure reveals substantial time variation in the size of the spread which can be related to 
distinct periods of distress in financial markets. Starting from a level of around 80 basis points in 
1973 and following the onset of the first oil price shock and the concomitant U.S. recession of 
1974-75, the default spread jumps above 200 basis points in 1975, but reverts back to the earlier 
level within the second half of the 1970s. Beginning in 1980, the spread starts to rise once again to 
levels above 200 basis points in the wake of the second oil price shock. Unlike in the previous 
episode, the spread remains at an elevated level throughout most of the 1980s. During that time 
period, the United States experienced a prolonged bout of distress in financial markets. In 1980, 
the Federal Reserve under the aegis of Chairman Paul Volcker began tightening the money supply 
in an attempt to defeat rising inflation, and the U.S. economy experienced the severe 1982 
recession. The Latin American debt crisis, originating with the Mexican debt default of August 
1982, forced U.S. banks to reschedule debt and to reduce additional lending. Only by forcing 
developing countries to keep up their interest payments, a major banking collapse was averted. 
However, the difficulties in U.S. financial markets did not abate but were even further aggravated 
by the Savings and Loan debacle which became the nation's largest-ever financial scandal. 
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Triggered by the bursting of the U.S. real-estate bubble in 1986, the crisis affected commercial 
banks, savings banks, and savings and loan associations (S&Ls). In its wake, some 1500 
commercial and savings banks and 1200 savings and loan associations failed. In addition, an even 
larger number of institutions were in precarious financial condition at some time during that period 
(Kaufman 1994). 
After reverting back to roughly its starting level in 1990, the default spread again rises above 
100 basis points in 1991. The renewed upsurge of the default premium in 1991 can be associated 
with the “credit crunch” of 1990-91. The “credit crunch” episode was a period of excessive 
corporate leverage and bank capitalization problems, forcing banks to substantially cut back on 
lending (Bernanke and Lown 1991, Bernanke and Gertler 1995: 41). After 1991, the spread begins 
a secular decline throughout the 1990s with the exception of a brief upward surge around 1998 and 
1999, which can be associated with the Asian financial crisis and the problems surrounding 
LTCM. Following the bursting of the internet bubble, the 9/11 terror attacks and the recession of 
2001, the spread returns to levels of around 150 basis points in 2002, before falling back to 
roughly its starting level of 80 basis points in 2004. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic Predictor Variables of Stock Returns 
We use the default spread to study structural breaks and regime changes in the links between stock 
returns and a number of macroeconomic predictor variables. In order to calculate excess stock 
returns, we compute the returns on the S&P 100 market price index (S&P100Z(PI)), add 
dividends, and subtract a three-months Treasury bill rate (USI60C..) as our measure of the short-
term interest rate. We use end-of-month data. The list of macroeconomic and financial predictor 
variables we consider as potential predictors of stock returns comprises six variables that have 
been used in numerous empirical studies of stock return predictability (Shiller 1984, Chen et al. 
1986, Rapach et. al 2005, among many others). These are the dividend yield (DIV_YIELD; 
S&P100Z(DY)); the term spread (TSP), defined as the difference between a long-term government 
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bond yield (USI61...) and the short-term interest rate; the inflation rate (INF), defined as the 
change in the natural logarithm of the consumer price index (USI64...F); the change in the natural 
logarithm of industrial production (DIPA; USI66..IG); the change in the natural logarithm of the 
narrowly defined money stock (DM1; USOMA033G); and the default spread (DEFSPREAD). In 
order to minimize the effects of data revisions on our results, we use the twelve-month moving 
averages of DIPA, INF, and DM1, and we account for a publication lag of one month. 
 
2.3 Linear Forecasting Regressions and Structural Breaks 
The informational content of the macroeconomic predictor variables for one-month-ahead stock 
returns can be analyzed by estimating the following linear forecasting model using the ordinary 
least squares technique:  
11 ' ++ += ttt xr εβ ,    , (1) 1,,2,1 −= Tt K
where  denotes one-month-ahead stock returns, 1+tr β  denotes the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated,  denotes the vector of explanatory variables, tx 1+tε  denotes a stochastic disturbance 
term, and T  denotes the sample size. The matrix of explanatory variables contains a constant and 
our six macroeconomic predictor variables. 
— Insert Table 1 about here. — 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the estimation results for the linear forecasting model. The 
estimation results show that the coefficients of the dividend yield (DIVYIELD), the inflation rate 
(INF), and money supply (DM1) have explanatory power for one-month-ahead stock returns. The 
adjusted coefficient of determination, however, is relatively small, suggesting that it is difficult to 
forecast stock returns. The interpretation of the estimation results, however, should not be 
stretched too far because the linear forecasting model does not account for potential structural 
breaks in the links between stock returns and the macroeconomic predictor variables. Panel B of 
Table 1 reports results of tests for structural breaks. The test results provide evidence of structural 
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breaks with regard to the informational content of the constant, the dividend yield, industrial 
production, and money supply for stock returns. The estimated respective months of the structural 
breaks are 1990/9, 1990/9, 1988/10, and 1985/8. This evidence of a structural break in the 
forecasting power of the dividend yield is in accordance with results for U.S. stock returns 
reported by Rapach and Wohar (2006) and Paye and Timmermann (forthcoming).  
It is interesting to note that the results of the tests for structural breaks harmonize with our 
identification of economic and financial crises based on the default spread. For example, at the end 
of the 1980s, the default spread significantly decreased and our identification suggests that the 
U.S. economy switched from a crisis regime to a no-crisis regime. The significant decrease in the 
default spread suggests that accounting for economic and financial crises should be relevant for the 
specification of the forecasting regression given in Equation (1). A simple way of accounting for 
structural breaks and regime changes triggered by economic and financial crises is to use an 
indicator function that identifies such crises. Based on the dynamics of the default spread shown in 
Figure 1, we define an indicator function, , that assumes the value one whenever the default 
spread exceeds 100 basis points, and zero otherwise. We choose 100 basis points to separate the 
crisis and no-crisis regimes because this value lies in between the mean (108 basis points) and the 
median (95 basis points) of the default spread. Equipped with this indicator function, we estimate 
the following forecasting equation: 
tI
1211 ')1(' ++ ++−= tttttt IxIxr εββ . (2) 
Panel C of Table 1 summarizes the estimation results. Obviously, the significance and magnitude 
of the coefficients of the dividend yield, industrial production, the inflation rate, and money supply 
differ between the crisis and the no-crisis regimes. In fact, the results suggest that macroeconomic 
variables (“fundamentals”) played an important role for forecasting stock returns in the no-crisis 
regime, and that other, possibly non-fundamental factors were instrumental in the crisis regime. 
Thus, though the forecasting equation given in Equation (2) could be refined in many ways, the 
estimation results suggest that taking into account structural breaks and regime changes triggered 
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by economic and financial crises should improve the performance of forecasting regressions that 
link stock returns to macroeconomic variables. 
Our analysis of the linear forecasting model extended to accommodate economic and financial 
crises rests on the assumption that the somewhat arbitrary value of the default spread of 100 basis 
points is a useful indicator for disentangling the crisis regime from the no-crisis regime. Visual 
inspection of Figure 1 indicates that using 100 basis points may be a good choice as a threshold to 
disentangle regimes. In order to quantitatively substantiate the choice of the threshold variable, we 
estimated, in a first step, the forecasting model given in Equation (2) for various values of the 
threshold, , using the conditional linear least squares technique as described in Hansen (1997a). 
In a second step, we store for every estimated model the estimated regression error, 
, where 
d
∑= +−= Tt tTd 1 112 ˆ)( εσ 1ˆ +tε  denotes the estimated disturbance term. In a third step, we follow 
Hansen (1997a) and compute the test statistic , where 
 is defined by . Finally, we plot in Figure 2 the statistic  for 
various values of the threshold, . The statistic, , assumes the value zero when 
*)(/*))()(()( 222 dddTdLR σσσ −=
*)(2 dσ
d
dd )(minarg* 2σ= )(dLR
d )(dLR *dd = , 
i.e., the threshold is equal to the optimal threshold that minimizes the regression error. Figure 2 
shows that the optimal threshold, , is estimated with great precision, because the statistic, 
, rapidly increases as . The optimal threshold is reached when the default spread 
assumes a value of 85 basis points. The confidence interval for the threshold, based on critical 
values reported in Hansen (1997a, Table 1), covers the interval [82, 93]. The estimated optimal 
threshold is thus close to the value of 100 basis points. In the analysis to follow, we will identify 
the crisis regime and the no-crisis regime based on a threshold of 100 basis points, a lower 
threshold of 85 basis points, and an upper threshold of 115 basis points. This is a useful check for 
the robustness of our empirical results, albeit one should always keep in mind that an investor, in 
real time, could not have estimated the forecasting model given in Equation (2) because our 
estimation of the threshold for the default spread is based on full-sample information. 
*d
)(dLR *dd ≠
— Insert Figure 2 about here. — 
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3. The Recursive Modeling Approach 
We now describe the recursive modeling approach in three steps. First, we describe how the 
approach can be used to recursively forecast stock returns in real time. Second, we describe how 
the approach can be used to assess the performance of simple trading rules. Third, we describe 
how the real-time forecasts of stock returns implied by the approach can be used to test for market 
timing.  
 
3.1 Recursive Forecasting of Stock Returns 
We consider an investor who uses the macroeconomic predictor variables described in Section 2 as 
candidates for forecasting stock returns. The investor must find out how to combine in an optimal 
way the macroeconomic predictor variables to future one-month-ahead stock returns. Hence, the 
investor must reach a decision under uncertainty about the optimal forecasting model. The investor 
reaches a decision by applying a recursive modeling approach (Pesaran and Timmermann 1995). 
With K potential macroeconomic predictor variables in hand, the investor searches, in every 
month, over all possible 2K permutations of forecasting models to identify the optimal forecasting 
model. As time progresses, the investor recursively restarts this search. In line with the forecasting 
model given in Equation (1), the investor examines forecasting models of the following format:  
ititit xr ,1,1 ' ++ += εβ , (3) 
where  denotes a model index and  denotes the macroeconomic predictor variables 
under model i. We assume that the investor uses five years of monthly data (1973/1–1977/12) as a 
training period to start the recursive forecasting of stock returns. 
Ki 2,...,2,1= itx ,
Given the large number of forecasting models being estimated in every month (in total we 
estimated more than seven million models), the investor needs a model-selection criterion to 
identify the optimal forecasting model. We consider four model-selection criteria: Adjusted 
Coefficient of Determination (ACD), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian 
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Information Criterion (BIC), and a Direction-of-Change Criterion (DCC). The definition of the 
ACD model-selection criterion is given by 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
−−=
++
++
11
,,11
,
, '
''
1
1
1
tt
itittt
itt
t
it rr
eerr
kT
TACD , (4) 
where , in Equation (4), denotes the vector of returns and  denotes the vector of the 
estimated residuals under model i in month t,  denotes the number of observations available in 
month t, and  denotes the number of regressors considered under model i in month t. In 
Equation (4), the variables are measured in deviation from mean. The optimal forecasting model is 
the one that maximizes the ACD model-selection criterion. The AIC model-selection criterion 
(Akaike 1973) and the BIC model-selection criterion (Schwarz 1978) are defined as  
1+tr ite ,
tT
itk ,
t
it
t
itit
it T
k
T
ee
AIC ,,,,
2'
ln += , (5) 
t
t
it
t
itit
it TT
k
T
ee
BIC ln
'
ln ,,,, += . (6) 
The optimal forecasting models minimize the AIC and BIC model-selection criteria. Finally, for 
the implementation of the DCC model-selection criterion, the number of correct in-sample 
forecasts of the sign of one-month-ahead stock returns is counted for every forecasting model and 
the following formula is being computed 
[∑
=
−−+=
T
t
ttttit rIrIrIrIT
DCC
1
, ))ˆ(1))((1()ˆ()(
1 ], (7) 
where  denotes the actual stock returns in month t ,  is the forecast of stock returns implied by 
model i in month t, and  denotes an indicator function that assumes the value one when 
, and zero otherwise. The optimal forecasting model is the one that maximizes the DCC 
model-selection criterion. 
tr trˆ
)(aI
0>a
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3.2 The Performance of Simple Trading Rules 
Given the four model-selection criteria, the recursive modeling approach implies four sequences of 
optimal forecasting models, and four sequences of one-month-ahead forecasts of stock returns. An 
investor can use the forecasts of stock returns to set up four simple trading rules. Every trading 
rule requires that an investor invests in stocks if the forecasts of stock returns are positive, and 
otherwise invests in bonds. In order to study the performance of the four simple trading rules, we 
introduce some notation. Our notation follows Pesaran and Timmermann (1995). 
An investor’s financial wealth at the end of month t is given by , the price of stocks at the 
end of month t is given by , and the dividends paid during month t are given by . The number 
of stocks held by an investor at the end of month t is given by , and an investor’s position in 
bonds is given by . Trading in stocks and bonds involves transaction costs that are (i) constant 
through time, (ii) the same for buying and selling stocks and bonds, and (iii) proportional to the 
value of a trade. The respective trading costs for trading in stocks and bonds are given by  and 
. There is no possibility of short selling. In addition, an investor does not use leverage when 
making an investment decision. It follows that an investor buys in month t a number of stocks 
 if , and a number of bonds 
tW
tP tD
tN
tB
1c
2c
ttt PWcN /)1( 1−= 0ˆ 1 >+tr tt WcB )1( 2−=  if . Finally, for 
tracking the sequences of investments an investor makes as time progresses, four different cases 
have to be considered: 
0ˆ 1 <+tr
• Case 1: The investor invests in stocks in month t+1, and reinvests cash dividends in month t+2. 
In this case, we have  and , 0ˆ 1 >+tr 0ˆ 2 >+tr 111 /)1( ++ −+= ttttt PcDNNN , and 01 =+tB . 
• Case 2: The investor invests in stocks in month t+1, but buys bonds in month t+2. In this case, 
we have  and , 0ˆ 1 >+tr 0ˆ 2 <+tr 01 =+tN , and ])1)[(1( 11121 +++ +−−= ttttt DNPNccB . 
• Case 3: The investor invests in bonds in month t+1, but buys stocks in month t+2. In this case, 
we have  and , 0ˆ 1 <+tr 0ˆ 2 >+tr 111 /)1()1( ++ +−= tttt PRBcN , and . 01 =+tB
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• Case 4: The investor invests in bonds in month t+1, and continues to invest in bonds in month 
t+2. In this case, we have 0ˆ 1 <+tr  and 0ˆ 2 <+tr , 01 =+tN , and . )1()1( 21 ttt RBcB +−=+
The dynamics of an investor’s financial wealth can be traced over time using the budget constraint 
, where  denotes the risk free interest rate on bonds. )1()( 112212 ++++++ +++= tttttt RBDPNW tR
The performance of the four simple trading rules can be compared in terms of Sharpe’s ratio 
(Sharpe 1966). Sharpe’s ratio is defined as jjj SDrSR /= , where SRj denotes Sharpe’s ratio under 
trading rule j, jr  denotes excess returns under trading rule j, and  denotes the standard 
deviation of excess returns under trading rule j.  
jSD
 
3.3 Market Timing 
We use the nonparametric test developed by Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) to test for market 
timing. Their test can be used to study the informational content of the forecasts of stock returns, 
, with regard to the sign of one-month-ahead realizations of stock returns, . For conducting 
the test, one computes the probabilities 
1ˆ+tr 1+tr
)0ˆ( 11 >= +trPP , )0( 12 >= +trPP  and , 
where  if , and zero otherwise. Using the definition 
, the test is computed as  
∑=−= Tt tZTP 11
1=tZ 0ˆ 11 >× ++ tt rr
)1()1( 2121
* PPPPP −×−+×=
*)()(
*
PVARPVAR
PPPT −
−= , (8) 
where  denotes the variance operator. The test has an asymptotic standardized normal 
distribution. The null hypothesis is that there is no information in the forecasts of stock returns 
over the sign of subsequent realizations of stock returns.  
VAR
4. Results 
Table 2 summarizes how often the macroeconomic predictor variables are included in the optimal 
forecasting models under the four model-selection criteria ACD, AIC, BIC, and DCC, when the 
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threshold for the default spread that divides the sample into a crisis regime and a no-crisis regime 
assumes the value of 100 basis points. The results for a lower threshold of 85 points and for a 
higher threshold of 115 basis points are similar and are not reported for the sake of brevity. The 
proportion of observations in the crisis regime under a threshold of 85 (100, 115) basis points is 57 
(36, 30) percent. Variables indexed by the suffix 1 apply in the crisis regime, and variables with a 
suffix 2 apply in the no-crisis regime. Table 2 shows that the dividend yield and inflation are 
primarily included in the optimal forecasting models when the U.S. economy was in the no-crisis 
regime (Regime 2). In contrast, the default spread is primarily included in the optimal forecasting 
model in the crisis regime (Regime 1). Thus, the inclusion of variables indicates that the 
informational contents of the macroeconomic predictor variables for forecasting stock returns 
differs across the crisis regime and the no-crisis regime.  
— Insert Table 2 about here. — 
Table 3 summarizes the results with regard to Sharpe’s ratio. We report results for a benchmark 
model that does not account for economic and financial crises, and for three models that account 
for these crises. The three models feature crisis thresholds of 85, 100, and 115 basis points for the 
default spread. We also report results for zero, medium-sized, and high transaction costs. 
Following Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), we assume medium-sized (high) transaction costs of 
0.5 and 0.1 of a percent (0.1 of a percent and 1 percent) for stocks and bonds, respectively. A 
comparison of the models that feature crisis thresholds with the benchmark model reveals that the 
Sharpe’s ratios are in general higher if an investor accounts for economic and financial crises when 
basing simple trading rules on out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns. For the model featuring a 
crisis threshold of 115 basis points, the higher Sharpe’s ratios reflect a lower standard deviation of 
excess returns than under the benchmark model. For the models featuring crisis thresholds of 85 
and 100 basis points, the higher Sharpe’s ratios also reflect higher mean excess returns. 
— Insert Table 3 about here. — 
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes tests of market timing for the benchmark model and for the models 
that feature crisis thresholds of 85, 100, and 115 basis points, respectively. In addition, we report 
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the noise-to-signal ratio. The noise-to-signal ratio, NTS, is defined as the ratio of the proportion of 
wrong sign forecasts and the proportion of correct sign forecasts. The NTS ratios should be as 
small as possible. The results show that accounting for economic and financial crises improves an 
investor’s market-timing ability as compared to the benchmark model. For the benchmark model, 
the tests for market timing are insignificant in the case of all four model-selection criteria. For the 
model that features a crisis threshold of 85 basis points, the tests for market timing yield 
significant results under all four model-selection criteria. For the model that features a crisis 
threshold of 100 basis points, three out of four tests for market timing yield significant results. 
Finally, for the model that features a crisis threshold of 115 basis points, only one test for market 
timing is significant. However, for all model-selection criteria, the results of the test for market 
timing are much better than under the benchmark model. The NTS ratios support these results. The 
NTS ratios are smaller than one in the case of the models that feature crisis thresholds, but are 
larger than one under the benchmark model. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of the tests for market timing and the NTS ratios for three 
additional models. The first model is an extension of the benchmark model to account for potential 
structural breaks and regime shifts induced by economic booms and recessions. Recessions are 
identified by means of the NBER classification system. The second model accounts for structural 
breaks and regime shifts by means of a rolling estimation window. In contrast to the models based 
on the recursive modeling approach, which is based on an expanding estimation window, this 
model features a constant five-year rolling estimation window. The third model is based on the 
assumption of a single structural break in 1989/12. Thus, this model does not account for potential 
regime changes induced by the economic and financial crises of the 1990s. This third model is 
tailored to capture the result reported by Aiolfi and Favero (2005) that the statistical and economic 
significance of the predictability of U.S. stock return has declined in the 1990s. For all three 
models, the tests for market timing yield insignificant results and the NTS ratios are in general 
larger than one. This shows that an investor would have benefited more from accounting for 
economic and financial crises when forming out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns than from (i) 
accounting for recessions or from accounting for structural breaks, (ii) accounting for regime shifts 
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by means of a rolling estimation window, and, (iii) accounting in a mechanical fashion for a 
potential structural break at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We argue that the use of publicly available and easily accessible information on economic and 
financial crises to detect structural breaks in the link between stock returns and macroeconomic 
predictor variables improves the performance of simple trading rules in real time. Our results 
suggest that accounting for structural breaks and regime shifts in forecasting regressions caused by 
economic and financial crises has the potential to increase the out-of-sample predictability of stock 
returns, the performance of simple trading rules, and the market-timing ability of an investor 
trading in the U.S. stock market.  
While we have reported some evidence of a systematic real-time link between economic and 
financial crises and forecasting regressions of stock returns, a lot of work still needs to be done. 
Given the mounting empirical evidence of structural breaks and regime shifts in forecasting 
regressions in economics and finance, it would be important to explore in future research whether 
results similar to our results can be established for other countries than the U.S. Moreover, because 
economic and financial crises in emerging market economies tend to be more frequent and very 
often also much larger than in mature industrialized countries, it would be interesting to explore 
the implications of our results for forecasting stock returns in emerging market economies. 
Furthermore, a natural question that could be explored in future research is whether the nature of a 
crisis matters for forecasting stock returns. For example, one could ask whether banking crises 
have the same effects on forecasting regressions for stock returns as currency crises. This question 
could also be used to motivate the development of indicators of economic and financial crises 
other than the default spread. For example, in the currency-crises literature a number of 
sophisticated early-warning systems for currency crises have been developed. It would be 
interesting to analyze whether such early-warning systems can provide guidance for an investor 
who seeks to compute out-of-sample forecasts of stock returns in real time.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 — The default spread, 1973–2006 
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Note: The default spread is defined as the difference between the yields on BAA and AAA rated 
corporate bond portfolios as described in Section 2.1. 
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Figure 2 — The estimated threshold of the default spread 
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Note: This figure shows the LR statistic as a function of the threshold for the default spread. The 
LR statistic is explained in Section 2.3. The critical value for an 80 percent level of confidence is 
taken from Hansen (1997a, Table 1). 
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Table 1 — The linear forecasting model, 1973–2006 
 
Panel A: Estimation results without accounting for economic and financial crises 
 
  Coefficient Std. error t-statistic 
Constant 0.002 0.009 0.265 
DIVYIELD 0.009 0.003 2.697*** 
DIPA -0.009 0.008 -1.131 
INF -0.048 0.019 -2.502** 
TSP 0.001 0.002 0.266 
DEFSPREAD 0.006 0.008 0.660 
DM1 -0.024 0.008 -3.063*** 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.031 
Adjusted R2   0.031 
 
 
Panel B: Tests for structural breaks 
 
  Andrews-Quandt test Andrews-Ploberger 
test 
  test p-value test p-value 
Constant 6.869 0.110 1.376 0.116 
DIVYIELD 10.010 0.026** 1.698 0.077* 
DIPA 13.427 0.005*** 4.758 0.001*** 
INF 6.562 0.126 0.834 0.253 
TSP 2.644 0.631 0.434 0.497 
DEFSPREAD 5.331 0.215 0.792 0.270 
DM1 8.554 0.051* 1.239 0.140 
 
 
Panel C: Estimation results with accounting for economic and financial crises 
 
  
Crisis regime 
   
No-crisis regime 
  
  Coefficient Std. error  t-statistic   Coefficient Std. error t-statistic 
Constant -0.011 0.021 -0.528 Constant -0.008 0.027 -0.307 
DIVYIELD 0.007 0.005 1.379 DIVYIELD 0.017 0.005 3.100*** 
DIPA -0.014 0.011 -1.310 DIPA 0.013 0.015 0.894 
INF -0.029 0.023 -1.249 INF -0.117 0.040 -2.902*** 
TSP 0.000 0.003 0.018 TSP 0.001 0.004 0.321 
DEFSPREAD 0.010 0.014 0.718 DEFSPREAD 0.015 0.030 0.507 
DM1 -0.011 0.016 -0.698 DM1 -0.027 0.012 -2.303** 
Durbin-Watson statistic      2.093 
Adjusted R2      0.050 
 
Note: The tests for structural breaks in the forecasting regression of one-month-ahead stock returns 
on macroeconomic predictor variables are described in detail in Andrews (1993), Andrews and 
Ploberger (1994), and Hansen (1997b). *** (**,*) denote significance at the one (five, ten) percent 
level. The sample period is 1973/1–2006/6. For definitions of variables, see Section 2.2. 
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Table 2 — Inclusion of variables in optimal forecasting models in percent, 1978–2006 
 
 
Variables ACD AIC BIC DCC 
DIVYIELD_1 11.76 0.29 0.00 69.71 
DIVYIELD_2 99.41 99.41 89.71 95.00 
DIPA_1 52.06 33.82 0.00 72.35 
DIPA_2 10.00 2.35 0.00 77.65 
INF_1 62.94 9.12 0.59 30.88 
INF_2 99.12 97.35 56.47 70.88 
TSP_1 9.71 1.76 0.00 34.41 
TSP_2 9.71 0.00 0.00 38.24 
DEFSPREAD_1 90.88 74.12 65.00 80.59 
DEFSPREAD_2 16.76 3.53 0.00 61.18 
DM1_1 31.47 4.12 0.00 45.59 
DM1_2 39.71 36.76 32.65 18.82 
 
 
Note: ACD denotes the Adjusted Coefficient of Determination, AIC denotes the Akaike 
Information Criterion, BIC denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion, and DCC denotes the 
Direction-of-Change Criterion. The threshold value of the default spread used to identify a crisis 
regime and a no-crisis regime is 100 basis points. The variable DIVYIELD_1 denotes the dividend 
yield in the crisis regime (Regime 1), and the variable DIVYIELD_2 denotes the dividend yield in 
the no-crisis regime (Regime 2). The names of the other variables can be interpreted in an 
analogous way. For definitions of variables, see Section 2.2. The investor uses five years of 
monthly data (1973/1–1977/12) as a training period to start the recursive forecasting of stock 
returns. 
 
 24
Table 3 — Sharpe’s ratio for simple trading rules, 1978–2006 
 
  Benchmark 
model  
Model with a 
threshold of 85 
basis points 
Model with a 
threshold of 100 
basis points 
Model with a 
threshold of 115 
basis points 
Zero transaction costs 
ACD 0.2305 0.2642 0.2376 0.2797 
AIC 0.2189 0.2539 0.2344 0.2561 
BIC 0.1974 0.2553 0.2185 0.2547 
DCC 0.1981 0.2657 0.2571 0.2224 
Medium-sized transaction costs 
ACD 0.2178 0.2410 0.2104 0.2536 
AIC 0.2069 0.2327 0.2096 0.2293 
BIC 0.1821 0.2391 0.1886 0.2312 
DCC 0.1763 0.2330 0.2219 0.1834 
High transaction costs 
ACD 0.2077 0.2228 0.1888 0.2349 
AIC 0.1974 0.2157 0.1899 0.2084 
BIC 0.1749 0.2258 0.1655 0.2133 
DCC 0.1596 0.2065 0.1945 0.1510 
 
 
Note: ACD denotes the Adjusted Coefficient of Determination, AIC denotes the Akaike 
Information Criterion, BIC denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion, and DCC denotes the 
Direction of Change Criterion. In every month, the investor selects four optimal forecasting 
models according to the ACD, AIC, BIC, and DCC model-selection criteria. For switching 
between stocks and bonds, the investor uses information on the optimal one-month-ahead stock-
return forecasts implied by the optimal forecasting models. When the optimal one-month-ahead 
stock-return forecasts are positive (negative), the investor only invests in shares (bonds), not in 
bonds (shares). The investor does not make use of short selling, nor does the investor use leverage 
when reaching an investment decision. We assume medium-sized (high) transaction costs of 0.5 
and 0.1 of a percent (0.1 of a percent and 1 percent) for stocks and bonds, respectively. The 
benchmark model does not account for economic and financial crises. The investor uses five years 
of monthly data (1973/1–1977/12) as a training period to start the recursive forecasting of stock 
returns. 
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Table 4 — Tests of market timing 
 
Panel A: Results for a benchmark model and models featuring crises thresholds 
 
  ACD AIC BIC DCC 
Benchmark model 
PT -0.69 -0.58 -0.84 -2.52 
NTS 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.14 
Model with a threshold of 85 basis points 
PT 2.03** 2.00** 2.32*** 1.76** 
NTS 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 
Model with a threshold of 100 basis points 
PT 1.40* 1.56* 1.76** 1.10 
NTS 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.92 
Model with a threshold of 115 basis points 
PT 1.61* 0.82 0.01 0.58 
NTS 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.96 
 
 
Panel B: Results for three alternative models 
 
  ACD AIC BIC DCC 
Model with regimes based on NBER recessions 
PT -0.52 -1.57 0.46 -1.17 
NTS 1.03 1.02 1.07 1.14 
Benchmark model with a rolling estimation window 
PT 0.28 -0.25 -0.80 0.94 
NTS 0.98 1.02 1.05 0.94 
Model with a structural break in 1989/12 
PT -1.02 -1.14 -1.79 -0.08 
NTS 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.00 
 
 
Note: PT denotes the nonparametric tests for market timing developed by Pesaran and 
Timmermann (1992). The Pesaran-Timmermann test has asymptotically a standard normal 
distribution. NTS denotes the noise-to-signal ratio, defined as the ratio of the proportion of wrong 
sign forecasts and the proportion of correct sign forecasts. The benchmark model does not account 
for economic and financial crises. 
 
 
